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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1990), whereby a 
defendant in a criminal action may take an appeal to the Court 
of Appeals from a final judgment in a Circuit Court. 
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This appeal is taken from the denial of the defendant's 
Motion to Suppress after a hearing in the Third Circuit Court, 
Sandy City Department, on January 22, 1990, the Honorable Roger 
A. Livingston presiding. On October 21, 1989, Bryan K. Small 
was arrested on the charges of Theft and Vehicle Burglary. On 
March 28, 1990, Small was convicted of the charges following a 
trial to the bench. 
On May 21, 1990, Judge Livingston sentenced Small on Count 
I to pay a $400.00 fine, and 90 days jail suspended upon 18 
months probation to the Court, 48 hours community service, 
$200.00 attorney fee and completion of a course at Western 
Corrections. On Count II, Judge Livingston sentenced Small to 
90 days jail, suspended upon 18 months probation to the Court 
under the same conditions. 
This appeal was filed on June 13, 1990. Ho other prior or 
related appeals have been filed. 
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STATEMENT QF FACTS 
On October 21, 1989, around 4:00 a.m., Salt Lake County 
Deputy Sheriff Hudson was patrolling the area around 1500 East 
Ft. Union Boulevard (Transcript — hereinafter MT M — at 12). 
The Santa Fe Apartment complex is located in that area. 
(T.12). While patrolling the area. Deputy Hudson saw something 
unusual. (T.12-13). He saw Mr. Small walking in a pathway 
that is not a normal pathway for someone to come out next to an 
apartment building. (T.13). When Deputy Hudson first observed 
Mr. Small he was not on a walkway, he was standing behind the 
terraced water fountain. (T.30). 
Deputy Hudson turned around and made contact with Mr. 
Small at the side of the street. (T.13). Deputy Hudson asked 
him his name, address, date of birth and why he was there at 
that time. (T.13). After supplying the information, but no 
driver's license, Deputy Hudson ran a driver's license check 
and a warrant check to verify his identity. (T.14). 
Mr. Small was not detained by Deputy Hudson and Deputy 
Hudson had not asked Mr. Small to remain there while the 
verification process was being performed. (T.14). 
As a result of the warrant and license check Deputy Hudson 
was notified of three warrants against Mr. Small. (T.15). 
Deputy Hudson advised Mr. Small of the warrants and placed him 
under arrest for the warrants. (T.17). 
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Sometime after 4:00 a.m., Deputy Fontaine was called to 
investigate a vehicle burglary in or around the Santa Fe 
Apartments. (T.46). During the course of his investigation, 
Deputy Fontaine heard over the dispatch radio that Deputy 
Hudson had stopped and arrested someone in the immediate area 
of the Santa Fe Apartments. (T.47). Deputy Fontaine received 
a description of someone who had been seen near the victims 
vehicle about the time that the vehicle burglary had occurred. 
(T.49). The description matched that of Mr. Small. (T.48). 
Deputy Fontaine asked Deputy Hudson to postpone his trip to the 
jail until he could arrive with the reporting witness. 
(T.48). The witness was asked to observe Mr. Small as he sat 
in the patrol car. (T.49). After the witness observed Mr. 
Small, he was taken to the Salt Lake County Jail. (T.50). 
Deputy Fontaine continued his investigation of the 
reported vehicle burglary. Deputy Fontaine located a vehicle 
that was registered to Mr. Small and had been described to the 
Deputy by a witness that had seen the car Mr. Small had been 
driving. (T.50). After completing his investigation. Deputy 
Fontaine went to the jail and placed charges of Vehicle 
Burglary and Theft. (T.50). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Appellee asserts that the encounter between the 
defendant and Deputy Hudson was constitutionally permissible. 
If the court finds the encounter to be an investigatory stop it 
was justified under Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15 
(1990). The denial of defendant's Motion to Suppress was 
proper. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INITIAL ENCOUNTER BETWEEN MR, SMALL 
AND DEPUTY HUDSON WAS CONSTITUTIONAL, 
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes three levels of police 
encounters which are constitutionally permissible: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen 
at anytime [sic] and pose questions so 
long as the citizen is not detained 
against his will; (2) an officer may 
seize a person if the officer has an 
"articulable suspicion" that the 
person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the 
"detention must be temporary and last 
no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop;" 
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if 
the officer has probable cause to 
believe an offense has been committed 
or is being committed. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)(quoting 
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United States v, Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984), 
cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1142, 106 S.Ct. 2250, 90 L.Ed.2d 696 
(1986). 
The appellant's initial encounter with Deputy Hudson falls 
into the first category. Deputy Hudson "saw Mr. Small walking 
in a pathway that is not a normal pathway for someone to come 
out next to an apartment building." (T.13). Then Deputy 
Hudson made contact with Mr. Small at the side of the street. 
(T.13). The appellant was asked his name, address, date of 
birth and why he was there at that time. (T.13). Mr. Small 
answered these questions freely and Deputy Hudson verified his 
identity by running a drivers license check and a warrant 
check. (T.14). Deputy Hudson did not ask Mr. Small to remain 
there and he was free to go at any time. (T.33-34). 
Mr. Small was detained only after the dispatcher informed 
Deputy Hudson of the three warrants against him. At that time, 
Mr. Small was placed under arrest. 
These facts are similar to the ones in Bountiful City v. 
Maestas. 788 P.2d 1062 (Utah App. 1990), where the court held 
"the initial encounter between the police officer and defendant 
falls into the first category." Xjd- at 1064 
The record shows that the police officer 
made the initial contact while defendant 
was sitting behind the wheel of a pick-up 
truck in the liquor store parking lot. 
The driver identified himself with a Utah 
driver's license. There is no evidence 
that the driver raised any objection to 
the officer's inquiry nor does it appear-
that defendant was detained against his 
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will- See Deitman, 739 P.2d at 618. We 
have previously ruled that an initial 
encounter of this type is "not a seizure 
subject to fourth amendment protection." 
Bennett, 741 P.2d at 967. 
It was only after the initial encounter, 
when the officer smelled alcohol on 
defendant's breath, that reasonable 
suspic i on arose. 
Id- at 1064. 
The Court held in State v. Houser. 669 P.2d 437 (Utah 
1983), "it is within the province of the trial judge to 
determine the reasonableness of the detention and its 
admissibility under the particular facts of each case." Xd. at 
439. 
The denial of defendant's Motion to Suppress by the trial 
judge shows that he found the stop reasonable and 
const itut ional. 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 77-7-15 (1990), 
If, in the alternative, the stop is ruled a level two 
encounter, it was appropriate under Utah Code Annotated Section 
77-7-15 (1990). 
"Though there may be no probable cause to make an arrest, 
a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an 
appropriate manner, approach a person for investigating 
possible criminal behavior." State v. Whittenb&ck, 621 P.2d 
103 (Utah 1980). 
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As the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
When a police officer sees or hears 
conduct which gives rise to suspicion of 
crime, he has not only the right but the 
duty to make observations and 
investigations to determine whether the 
law is being violated; and if so, to take 
such measures as are necessary in the 
enforcement of the law. 
Id. at 105 (citing State v. Folkes. 565 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1977). 
This is codified in Section 77-7-15, which allows: "a 
peace officer to stop any person in a public place when he has 
a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the 
act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense 
and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions." 
"This section thus permits a brief investigatory stop of 
an individual by police officers when the officers have a 
reasonable suspicion based on objective facts, that the 
individual is involved in criminal activity." State v. 
Baumgaertel. 762 P.2d 2, 3-4 (Utah App. 1988). The court 
explained "because a trained law enforcement officer may be 
able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which 
would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer, he may 
assess these facts in light of his experience." Id- at 4. 
Mr. Small was out at 4:00 a.m. in an area that had 
experienced a number of car prowls and thefts during the past 
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week. The court further ruled that, "traveling in a lawful 
manner at a late hour in a high crime area..-is not sufficient 
to support a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is involved 
in criminal conduct." Xd. at 4. 
There was more to Mr. Small's behavior on the night he was 
the subject of an investigatory stop. As Deputy Hudson 
testified, "I saw Mr. Small walking in a pathway that is not a 
normal pathway for someone to come out next to an apartment 
building." (T.13). Deputy Hudson said when he first saw Mr. 
Small he was not on a walkway, he was standing behind the 
terraced water fountain. (T.30). 
While these actions may seem innocent, they could lead a 
trained law enforcement officer with experience to see 
something suspicious in them. 
Mr. Small was briefly detained in order to explain his 
whereabouts legitimately under Utah Code Annotated Section 
77-7-15 (1990). 
CONCLUSION 
The initial stop by Deputy Hudson was constitutional under 
Maestas. as a simple question-answer session where the 
defendant was not detained against his will. There were also 
articulable facts which justified the stop under Utah Code 
Annotated Section 77-7-15 (1990). The denial of defendant's 
Motion to Suppress was proper. 
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For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the 
plaintiff./appellee, THE STATE OF UTAH, respectfully requests 
this court to deny the appeal from the denial of the 
defendant/appellant's Motion to Suppress. 
DATED this 
# 
TL day of January, 1991. 
'JOE A. GREENLIEF 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Appellee / 
-11-
CERTIFICATE QF DELIVERY 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Roger K. 
Scowcroft, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 424 East 500 South, 
#300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this < / ^ day of January, 1991. 
-12-
